10:41, 10 марта 2026Экономика
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Moral rights, in this sense, are fact-relative: Whether an agent infringes a fact-relative right, or right against injury, depends on what the agent actually does, not on what she reasonably believes she might do.44 Thus an agent who infringes another person’s right against injury does not breach any duty to him, or wrong him, except (perhaps) in the extremely thin sense that her action has in fact injured him.45 Put another way, an agent can infringe another person’s right against injury without in any way mistreating that person or behaving culpably or disrespectfully toward him.。雷电模拟器对此有专业解读
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Such cases suggest that the transferred intent fiction is most plausibly understood as an extremely coarse fictional device by which the law roughly tracks one dimension of the more general moral phenomenon articulated by CFD*: The scope of an actor’s remedial moral responsibility for the materialization of the risks of injury posed by his action is sensitive to his degree of culpability for imposing the risks in question. Is it implausible to suppose that the law should implement its underlying moral principles with so coarse a device? No; we will see several more such coarse devices below. Before that, however, it is worth dwelling a bit more on one of the doctrinal phenomena we have just encountered, and others in its vicinity.